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ments, known as *tariqas*, were popular all over the Islamic world: the Mawlawiyya and Naqshbandiyya (in the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia), the Qadiriyya (Iraq), the Rifa'iyya (Egypt), and the Tijaniyya and Sanusiyya (North Africa). Sufi movements in the modern period assumed various political roles, sometimes strengthening the religious legitimacy of governments, and at other times mobilizing their networks in the anti-colonial struggle.

Islamic Modernism. The growth of European colonial economic and political dominance of the Islamic world in the nineteenth century elicited various responses from various Islamic regions. Europe's economic and technological progress at the time generated a debate in the Islamic world as to how a similar experiment could be successfully applied in the Islamic world. A range of Muslim thinkers from various countries, Jamal al-Din al-AFGHANI (Iran), Muhammad ABDUH (Egypt), Rashid RIDA (Lebanon), and KHAYR AL-DIN al-Tunisi (Tunisia) concurred on the need for the Islamic community to open its doors for ideas and scientific disciplines developed in the West in order to strengthen the ability of Islamic societies to defend against outside domination. Invariably they agreed that the rigidity that was pervasive in Islamic society, institutions, and governments had little to do with the earliest traditions of Islam, which propelled the scientific and intellectual achievements of medieval Islamic civilization. To effect a renewal, these scholars argued the need to return to the pristine roots of Islamic thought, which encourage the pursuit of scientific inquiry and foster the mission of human progress. Western patterns, ranging from the secular system of primary and secondary school education to the parliamentary form of government, became popular goals of the new reformist generation. The most daring change that took place in this period was the adoption by some states, such as the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, of considerable sections of the Western legal codes alongside the traditional Islamic legal code (*Shari'a*). In areas such as commercial law, where the circumstances of international markets had become too complex to be sufficiently addressed by the *Shari'a*, the Western code was imported intact. Similar changes were also introduced in the spheres of criminal and civil law. The Islamic laws of personal status and succession, however, underwent little or no alteration. This trend of reconciling the basic rules of the Islamic *Shari'a* with new civil statutory laws has continued into present times, as has the debate between the Islamic modernists seeking a contemporary reading of classical Islamic ideas, and traditionists in favor of a singular reliance on the letter of the *Shari'a*.

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Tayeb El-Hibri

Islamic Amal

Radical movement of Lebanese Shi'a militants that split from AMAL.

The split from AMAL occurred when Nabi BERRI, AMAL's leader, joined the Karame government of Lebanon in 1982. Islamic Amal, led by Husayn Musawi, was based in Ba'albak. It may have been responsible for the bombings of the U.S. and French compounds that had been set up for the peacekeeping force in Beirut after Israel's withdrawal from the city's edge. The attacks were in response to the peace forces' perceived support of moves by the government of Lebanon against Shi'a forces and population centers.

Islamic Amal did not engage in independent activity after the bombing incidents, and its members apparently joined similar movements. Musawi, who became active in Hizbullah, was killed in southern Lebanon by Israeli forces in 1991.

Jenab Tutunji

Islamic Congresses

Muslims, either of a certain faction or in general, convening to promote solidarity and interaction among Muslim peoples and states.

Although the concept of Muslim solidarity is intrinsic to the faith of ISLAM, it took no organized form until modern times. In the course of the twentieth

century, Islamic congresses have emerged as the structured expression of that concept. Some of these congresses have evolved into international Islamic organizations, which promote political, economic, and cultural interaction among Muslim peoples and states.

The idea of Muslims convening in congresses first gained currency in the late nineteenth century, in the Ottoman Empire. The advent of easy and regular steamer transport accelerated the exchange of ideas among Muslims and made possible the periodic assembling of representatives. The idea also appealed to Muslim reformists, who sought a forum to promote and sanction the internal reform of Islam. Such an assembly, they believed, would strengthen the ability of Muslims to resist the encroachments of Western imperialism.

A number of émigré intellectuals in Cairo first popularized the idea in the Muslim world. In 1900, one of them, the Syrian Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, published an influential tract entitled *Umm al-Qura,* which purported to be the secret protocol of an Islamic congress convened in Mecca during the pilgrimage of 1899. The imaginary congress culminated in a call for a restored Arab CALIPHATE, an idea then in vogue in reformist circles. Support for such a congress also became a staple of the reformist journal *al-Manar,* published in Cairo by Rashid RIDA. The Crimean Tatar reformist Ismail Gaspirali (Russian, Gasprinski) launched the first concrete initiative in Cairo in 1907, where he unsuccessfully worked to convene a general Islamic congress.

Kawakibi's book, Rida's appeals, and Gaspirali's initiative all excited the suspicion of Ottoman authorities. The Ottoman Turks believed that a well-attended Islamic congress would fatally undermine the religious authority claimed by the theocratic Ottoman sultan-caliph and, in particular, feared the possible transformation of any such congress into an electoral college for choosing an Arab caliph. Steadfast Ottoman opposition thwarted all the early initiatives of the reformers.

With the final dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, a number of Muslim leaders and activists moved to convene general Islamic congresses. In each instance, they sought to mark their causes or their ambitions with the stamp of Islamic consensus. In 1919, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk convened an Islamic congress in Anatolia to mobilize pan-Islamic support for his military campaigns. During the hajj (pilgrimage) season of 1924, Sharif Husayn ibn ali of the Hijaz summoned a pilgrimage congress in Mecca to support his claim to the caliphate—a maneuver that failed to stall the relentless advance of Ibn Sa'ud (ABD AL-AZIZ IBN SA'UD). Following Ibn Sa'ud's occupation of Mecca, he convened his own world congress during the pilgrimage season of 1926. The leading clerics of al-Azhar in Cairo convened a caliphate congress there in 1926 to consider the effects of the abolition of the caliphate by Turkey two years earlier. The congress was supported by King FU'AD, who reputedly coveted the title of caliph, but no decision issued from the gathering. In 1931, Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem, convened a general congress of Muslims in Jerusalem to secure pan-Islamic support for the Arab struggle against the British mandate and Zionism. In 1935, pan-Islamic activist Shakib Arslan convened a congress of Europe's Muslims in Geneva to carry the protest against imperialism and colonialism to the heart of Europe. Each of these congresses resolved to create a permanent organization and convene additional congresses. But all such efforts were foiled by internal rivalries and the intervention of the European powers.

With spreading post–World War II political independence for Middle East states, several Muslim leaders offered new plans for the creation of a permanent organization of Muslim states. After the partition of India, Pakistan took a number of initiatives in the late 1940s and early 1950s but soon encountered stiff opposition from Egypt, which gave primacy of place to PAN-ARABISM and the Arab League. When Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser transformed pan-Arabism into a revolutionary doctrine, Saudi Arabia sought to counter him by promoting a rival pan-Islamism, assembling congresses of Muslim activists and ULAMA (Islamic clergy) from abroad. In 1962, the Saudi government sponsored the establishment of the Mecca-based Muslim World League, which built a worldwide network of Muslim clients. Beginning in 1964, Egypt responded by organizing large congresses of Egyptian and foreign *ulama* under the auspices of al-Azhar's Academy of Islamic Researches in Cairo. These rival bodies then convened a succession of dueling congresses in Mecca and Cairo, each claiming the sole prerogative of defining Islam. In 1965/66, Saudi Arabia's new king, Faisal (son of Ibn Sa'ud), launched a campaign for an Islamic summit conference that would have balanced the Arab summits dominated by Egypt. President Nasser of Egypt, however, had sufficient influence to thwart the initiative, which he denounced as a foreign-inspired Islamic pact, designed to defend the interests of Western imperialism.

Israel's 1967 defeat of Arab armies and its annexation of Jerusalem eroded faith in the brand of Arabism championed by Egypt—inspiring a return to Islam. This set the scene for a renewed Saudi initiative. In September 1969, following an arsonist's at-

tack against the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, Muslim heads of state set aside their differences and met in Rabat, Morocco, in the first Islamic summit conference. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took this opportunity to press for the creation of a permanent organization of Muslim states. The effort succeeded, and, in May 1971, the participating states established the ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC; *Munazzamat al-mu'tamar al-islami*). The new organization, headquartered in Jidda, Saudi Arabia (pending the liberation of Jerusalem), adopted its charter in March 1972.

The OIC eventually earned a place of some prominence in regional diplomacy, principally through the organization of triennial Islamic summit conferences and annual conferences of the foreign ministers of member states. The OIC's activities fell into three broad categories. First, it sought to promote solidarity with Muslim states and peoples that were locked in conflict with non-Muslims. Most of its efforts were devoted to the causes of establishing a state of PALESTINE and of recapturing Jerusalem, although it supported Muslim movements from Eritrea (incorporated into Ethiopia in 1962) to the Philippines. Second, the organization offered mediation in disputes and wars among its own members, although its effectiveness was greatly limited by the lack of any force for truce supervision or peacekeeping. Finally, the OIC sponsored an array of subsidiary and affiliated institutions to promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation among its members. The most influential of these institutions was the Islamic Development Bank, established in December 1973 and formally opened in October 1975. The bank, funded by the wealthier OIC states, financed development projects while adhering to Islamic banking practices.

The OIC represented the culmination of governmental efforts to organize Muslim states. But it did not end moves by individual states to summon international congresses of *ulama,* activists, and intellectuals. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, realigned on the conservative end of the Islamic spectrum, increasingly cooperated in mounting large-scale Islamic congresses. Their rivals—Iran, Libya, and Iraq—did the same. Divisive events, such as the war between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988), the killing of several hundred Iranians in Mecca during the pilgrimage season of 1987, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the Arab–Israel peace talks that began in 1991 produced congresses and countercongresses, each claiming to express the verdict of united Islam. Leaders of Muslim opposition movements also met in periodic congresses, sometimes on the safe ground of Europe. Less than a century after Kawakibi's fantasy, a crowded calendar of congresses bound together the world of Islam as never before—but it remains uncertain whether these often competing institutions bridge the differences between Muslims or serve to widen them.

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Martin Kramer

Islamic Jihad

Palestinian liberation movement.

Islamic Jihad emerged from the Islamic revivalist tradition of the association of MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip. Rather than pursue the Brotherhood's policy of the gradual Islamization of Palestinian society as the basis for future liberation from Israeli occupation, certain militants in the 1970s began arguing for a more active, armed, Islamic response to the occupation much as secular groups associated with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) had undertaken. Sources of inspiration included such militant historical figures as Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam in Palestine and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, as well as the revolutionary movements spawned by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj in Egypt (the Jihad Organization) and the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran. What tied these traditions together was their belief in active struggle (*jihad*) in the service of Islam as opposed to mere preaching.

It is believed that Islamic Jihad emerged as an actual organization in 1980. Two early leaders were Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Awda, deported by Israeli authorities in November 1987, and his successor, Fathi Abd al-Aziz Shiqaqi, himself deported in August 1988. Shiqaqi operated in Lebanon thereafter until his assassination in Malta in October 1995. One of Islamic Jihad's first dramatic acts against the Israeli occupation was an attack on a group of soldiers in